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Abstract
This study was designed to test the power of an additive versus a weighted
average model of impression formation in predicting the subject's evaluation
of a stimulus object on the basis of the subject's prior evaluation of separate pieces of information used to describe the stimulus object.

Two hundred

ten subjects were randomly placed in one of fourteen experimental groups.

The

general design of the study was a 2 x 7 factorial involving two orders of presentation of stimulus material and seven levels of affective information.
With regard to levels of affective information, the subject received either
one, two or three

pie~es

of information about the stimulus object - each piece

varying in affective importance to the subject, i.e., High affective importance
Medium, low or the combinations High-Medium, High-low, Medium-low or HighMedium-low.
With regard to order of presentation of stimulus material, subjects received their information in a manner such that the addition of each successive
piece of information had less affective importance: e.g., High-Medium-low,
High-Medium, High-low, Medium-low, High alone, Medium alone and low alone or
the subjects received their information in such a manner that the addition
of each successive piece of information had more affective importance e.g.,
low-Medium-High, Medium-High, low-High, Low-Medium, High alone, Medium alone
or low alone.
On the basis of each subject's evaluation of each piece of information
alone, predicted scores were calculated for the subject's obtained evaluation
of the stimulus object on the basis of Fishbein's summation model, and
Fulcrum model (an averaging model).
vi

Izzet~s

Resul~s

indicated that the predicted scores derived from the Fulcrum

(averaging) model correlated to a significantly greater extent with the obtained evaluation of the stimulus object than those scores derived from Fishbein' s summation model.

Also, there was no main effect for order of present-

ation of stimulus information and no interaction between order of presentation
and levels of information, however, there was a significant main effect due
to amount of information presented.

The main effect due to amount of informa-

tion presented supported the Fulcrum model at the .E< .001 level, i.e., describing a stimulus object with two or more pieces of information varying in
affect and importance but all having the same sign (positive) results in a
~

favorable impression of the stimulus object than what would have been ob-

tained had the stimulus object been described by only one piece of information
- namely, that piece which has the highest affect x importance rating of the
two piece combination.
The conclusion drawn from this finding was that as a result of obtaining
one piece of information about the stimulus object having high affect and
importance, t.he subject develops a generalized expectation that the stimulus
object will be high on all traits or characteristics and that as a result of
being given a second piece of infonnation about the stimulus object which does
not measure up to the subject's expectations, the adaptation level of the subject concerning future expectations about the stimulus object drops - hence
the

av~raging

effect.
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-A FULCRUM MODEL OF OPINION FORMATION
AND

CHANGE

Richard R. Izzett
IJ:>yola University, Chicago
In recent years, the literature in the area of attitude formation and
change bas been expanding at a rapid rate.

Since the Hovland, Janis and

Kelley (1953) Yale communication series, social-psychologists have turned
their attention to a number of basic issues involved in attitude formation
and change: effects of source credibility, ego-involvement in the issue,
primacy-recency effects, the effect of cornmunicator-comrnunicatee discrepancy,
the importance of attention, comprehension and acceptance of message to attitude change, active versus passive participation, the effects of repetition,
one-sided versus two-sided communications, the sleeper effect and so on.
Out of this mass of research have emerged two basic camps: the cognitive
consistency theorists exemplified by Heider (1946), Newcomb (1953), Feather

(1964), Festinger (1957), Osgood and Tannenbaum (1955) and M. Rosenberg and
Abelson (1960) who advocate that attitude formation and change is a function
of the individual's striving for a state of cognitive balance and that whenever imbalance occurs the individual will seek any one of a number of ways
to restore balance such as source derogation, denial of source advocating the
communication or attitude change itself.

Secondly, there are the reinforce-

ment theorists who utilize concepts of behavioristic psychology to explain
attitude formation and change.

·(1953),

Sta~ts

Theorists such as Hovland, Janis and Kelley

(1961), wtt (1955) and Fishbein (1961) argue that attitudf!

--change may be a function of the reward value associated with a particular
position.

An individual may hold a particular attitude toward an attitude

object, because the position is advocated by a source who has been associated
with rewarding experiences in the past, because the position itself is intrinsically satisfying and fits in with one's own values or because the particular
position has been successful in the past as a means to some desired end.
Regardless of the camp which the individual follows, it is evident and
must be conceded that an individual's attitude toward a given attitude object
is in part a function of the information he has about the attitudinal object.
Rhine (1958) has indicated that the more unique the stimuli defining a concept
the more clearly defined the concept, i.e., the more information an individual
is given about an attitudinal object, the more informed and knowledgeable the
individual is about the defining characteristics of that class of objects.
For example, the more physical defining characteristics a child is given about
a dog, the stronger the child's belief that a given object is a dog providing
the object of his inspection has all the defining characteristics.
The area of impression formation provides a fertile field within which
to explore the function that information plays in shaping a person's attitude
toward a given object of perception.

As indicated by

s.

Rosenberg (1968)

the typical impression formation experiment involves the presentation of a
list of adjectives describing the object person to the subject and then the
measurement of the subject's attitude to the stimulus person so described.
A general question that has arisen in this field is: can the overall rating
of attractiveness of an object be predicted from the scale values of the
attractiveness of each adjective alone, i.e., does there exist within the
.2
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precise language of mathematics a general mathematical function which may be
utilized to predict the overall impression of an attitude object based upon
the scale values of each piece of information prior to combination?
Two general models have been put forth - one an additive model and the
other an averaging or weighted average model

each originating from the rein-

forcement theorists' and consistency theoriests' camps respectively.

In a

test of the utility of an additive model, N. Anderson (1962) had his subjects
rate on a 20 point scale of attractiveness, a number of hypothetical persons
who were described by a set of three adjectives.

Here Anderson found a carrel-

ation of 0.967 between the obtained and the predicted scores based on the
additive model.

However, in Anderson's case, definitive evidence in favor of

an additive model was not provided since a comparative prediction was not
termined for an averaging model.

de~

Likewise, Levy and Richter (1963) using

facial photographs as stimuli found evidence supporting the proposition that
individual items of information combine in an additive manner to determine
the overall impression of the stimulus object.

But again as in the case of

the 1962 Anderson study, no comparable predictions were attempted for an averaging model.

Further evidence supporting cognitive SU.'TU1lation has been obtained

by Feldman (1962), Kerrick (19.58), Podell and Podell (1963) and Tanka (1964).
Following this line of thinking, Fishbein (1961, 1963, and 196.5) has
developed a summation theory of attitude organization and change which is
based upon the

relation~hips

toward the object.

between beliefs about an object and the attitude

Fishbein's theory would predict that an individual's

attitude toward any given object would be a function of the individual's
beliefs about the object and the evaluative aspects of those beliefs.

,3

Also.

Fishbein's theory would predict that the individual's attitude toward an object is in part a function of the total amount of affect associated with each
of the beliefs about the object, i.e., infonnation about an attitudinal object is combined in an additive fashion.

This may be represented by the fol-

lowing fonnula:

where

A0 = the attitude toward a given object "o"
Bi_ = the strength of the belief i about o. Here
Fishbein defines belief as the probability
dimension of a concept, where the probability
dimension may refer to the belief in a concept
(the probability that the concept does exist),
or the belief about a concept (the probability
that a specific relation exists between the
concept and some other object). Operationally,
the beliefs in or about a concept are measured
by an instrument called the B scale (Fishbein
and Raven, 1962).
ai = the evaluati:ve aspect of Bi which is operationally
measured by a series of Osgood's evaluative semantic differential scales.
N = the number of beliefso
Fishbein bas evidenced support for his summation theory in a series
of studies (Fishbein and Hunter, 1964; Triandis and Fishbein, 1963; L. Anderson and Fishbein, 1965).

As pointed out by S. Rosenberg (1968), a critical

test of the difference between the summation and averaging fonnulations can
be illustrated by the following question:

"If a subject is presented with a

single highly desirable trait adjective, will this result in a more favorable
impression than if he were presented with the same highly desirable adjective
along with another adjective that is only moderately desirable?" (p. 191).
In a test of the adequacy of the summation model in answering this question,

4

Fishbein and Hunter presented four groups of subjects with varying amounts of
positively evaluated information about a stimulus person in such a way that
the average amount of affect which was associated with the information decreased as a function of the amount of information presented.

The total amount of

affect, however, increased with the amount of information presented.

Fishbein

and Hunter contended that the results of this study lend support to their sum~ation

model, i.e., the obtained evaluation of the stimulus object increased as

a function of the amount of information presented even though the average amount
of affect associated with the information decreased.

Rosenberg, however, points

out that the interpretation of Fishbein and Hunter's data in support of an additive model is not unequivocal since the information presented about the stimulus object was presented sequentially - with the more favorable information
consistently being presented before the less favorable information.

As Rosen-

berg indicated, sequential presentation of information may result in differential weighting of the information.
In a further test of Fishbein's summation model, and overcoming the criticisms of the Anderson (1962) study and the Levy and Richter (1963) study made
by Rosenberg (1968), L. Anderson and Fishbein (1965) compared the predictive
power of Fishbein's summation theory to that of Osgood's (1955) congruity
theory.

In contrast to Osgood's congruity theory which predicts that an atti-

tude is in part a function of the average amount of affect associated with the
information, again Fishbein predicted that the individual's attitude would be
a function of the total amount of affect and not just the average.

Not only

did the mean ratings of all groups support summation theory but Fishbein also
found that predictions based on his theory correlated significantly higher
with the obtained attitude scores than the predictions stemming from Osgood's

5

congruity theory.
Norman Anderson (1965) also conducted a study to make a comparative test
of the summation and averaging models.

Anderson presented various sets of

two and four adjectives varying in degree of affectiveness to his subjects.
The two groups of primary concern in testing the summation prediction versus
the averaging prediction were those that received either two pieces of high
positive information (HH) and those that received four pieces of information two high positive and two medium positive (Hill'TI1).

According to summation

theory, that group of subjects which received the four pieces of information
(HHMM) should rate the stimulus object to a more favorable degree than that
group of subjects which received only two pieces of' high positive information
(HH).

Anderson obtained significant results; however, the results were in

support of an averaging theory, i.e., that group of subjects which received
HHMM information rated the stimulus object
which received the HH information.

~

favorable than that group

Anderson also obtained a finding which

would seem to contradict the averaging model.

He found that the mean rating

of the group of subjects given four high positive pieces of infonnation (HHMM)
was greater than that group given just two high positive pieces of information
(HH).

This finding would seem to support the summation model over the averag-

ing mocel.

Rosenberg indicates that this finding can be accounted for by an

averaging model if one assumes the existence of an initial impr•:ission such
that tbe final impression is an average of the affect associated with the
stimulus information presented as well as the initial impression.

One of the

weaknesses of Anderson's work in this area, is that in utilizing an averaging
model, he has been assuming that the stimulus information which he presents

..

to his subjects all have equal weights, i.e., in combining the four pieces

6
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of )nforn:.ation HHNM, he would predict the obtained evaluation of the stimulus
object to be a function of the sum of the affect associated with each piece
of information divided by four (the number of pieces of information).

However,

in the same study, Anderson (1965) found that the average of the subject's
impression rating of the stimulus object described by tbe information LLLL
and the stimulus object Mr1-M-M- did not equal the rating that the subject
gave to the stimulus object described by the information LIM-M-.

In effect

his results suggested that the L adjectives were given greater weight than
the M- adjectives, i.e., that even when subjects were instructed that each
of the adjectives are equally important, they may in fact not pay equal attention to all adjectives (some adjectives being given greater weight than others).
Anderson and Jacobson (1965) also found differential weighting effects
not only when the information about the stimulus object is affectively inconsistent but also when it is semantically inconsistent.

Thus as Rosenberg

(1968) indicates, the assumption of equal weights does not always appear to
be completely adequate.

Also, results of a study by Podell and Podell (1963)

suggest that extreme adjectives (H) are given greater weight than other adjectives and hence some subjects when presented with stimulus information may
even go so far as to assigning weights of zero to some information.
Another weakness of the work by Anderson dealing with an averaging model
of impression formation has to do with the underlying psychological processes
involved within the subject.
the descriptive level,

~e.,

Thus far, the work of Anderson has remained at
demonstrating that within his experiments in-

formation presented to the subject seems to combine in an averaging fashion
and not in a summation fashion, but he does not attempt to explain this
phenomenon.

Thus, in an attempt to further investigate the summation versus

7

averaging conflict in impression and opinion formation and in an attempt to
give more precise meaning to the weight given to stimulus information and in
an attempt to explain the underlying psychological processes involved, the
following fulcrum model is postulated.
One may look at the area of impression formation and opinion formation
in terms of a physical analogy based on principles of physics.

Consider for

example a typical balance scale where the fulcrum of the scaie represents
a balance point (viz. a teeter-totter).

If we take for a starting point the

case where the individual is totally unfamiliar with the stimulus object
whether it be a person in the case of impression formation or an issue in
the case of opinion formation, one can represent the psychological state of
the individual in the following manner:

extremely
unfavorable

~

extremely
favorable

-t
Fulcrum
Here the individual has no information whatever about the stimulus object and
hence his point of balance (represented by the fulcrum) will fall in the
middle of tbe scale in the neutral zone, i.e., if one were to·conceptualize
a teeter-totter that was perfectly balanced which had no weights placed on
either side (in our case the weights being pieces of information), the pivotal
point (fulcrum) or point of balance would be directly in the middle.
Now if a weight were to be placed on either side of the teeter-totter,
the

plan~

itself would tilt down in the direction of the weighted end.

ically, this may be represented as follows:
8'

Graph-

-,rweight added
hence

0

LS

In order for the plank itself to be restored to a level state, the weight
would have to be removed, another weight added on the other side of the fulcrum, or the fulcrum itself would have to shift in the direction of the
weight.

Graphically this may be represented as follows:
1 Weight

No Weight

0

Going back to our impression formation situation then, the plank may be
said to represent a scale of affect ranging from extremely unfavorable at
one end of the scale through a neutral zone to an extremely favorable position
at the other end of the plank.

It is apparent then that any one weight (piece

of information) will have three components.

First, it will have direction,

i.e., it will fall to either the left or right side of the fulcrum; secondly,
it will have extremity; :i.e.' if it falls on the right side it may fall right
next to the fulcrum or it may fall at the extreme end of the plank or at any
intermediate value between these two points.
vary in size (intensity).

Thirdly, the weight itself will

For example, consider the case of two pieces of

information having the same direction, the same extremity but different
intensities.

One situation would be represented as follows:

0

ZS:
II:

1!

9

,,

'1'i

I/!
I

I

I'!
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and the other as:
0

let us consider now a number of hypothetical situations concerning opinion formation in a physical sense.

A.

,.,

B.

,-_------------·)
,___
.

c.

0

0

~

0
0
0
0
/\
~

0
0
0
0
.\
-e-----/\
./·--

D.

0

0
0
0
0

In situation f;,, the individual is totally unfamiliar with the issue and
bas no information whatsoever about the issue and hence the fulcrum is in the
middle of the plank representing a neutral position concerning the stimulus
object.
In situation ], the individual has been given four pieces of information
supporting the exact same position and all pieces of information have the
same intensity; hence the fulcrum bas nov shifted to a point of balance dir10

ectly under the four pieces of information thus representing the individual's
new position on the issue.
In situation

£,

the individual has been given two new pieces of information

which have a different direction and extremity than the information given in
situation

~

and hence the fulcrum will shift again but this time in the dir-

ection of the two new pieces of information.

Also, the amount of the shift

will not be as much as advocated by the two new pieces of information (were
the other four pieces not already existing).

Instead, there will only be a

partial change in the direction advocated - the shift being to a point of
balance betwe_en the two new pieces of information and the four old pieceso
Notice that in the above "three situations, it is assumed that all the
pieces of information have the same intensity or weight (represented by the
same sized circles), although they do have different direction and extremity.
.

.

However, as pointed out above, different pieces of information may have different weights and it may be that one piece of information will be of sufficient
intensity to counterbalance.a number of other pieces of information of lesser
intensity.

Hence in situation ,!2 we have an example of the occasion where one

piece of intense information counterbalances a number of other pieces of lesser
intensity.
For example, an individual may be prejudiced against negroes because they
are "lazy", "dirty", "uneducated" and "unreliable".

One may hold this atti-

tude toward negroes for a long time, however, the attitude may be changed by
one piece of intense information.

Suppose for example, that a negro saved

the life of the prejudiced white man as well as the lives of his wife and
children.

This one piece of evaluative information may be of sufficient in11'

to counterbalance his former prejudicial attitude.
As is evident from the above figures, the more knowledge the individual
has supporting a given direction and extremity, the more difficult it will
be to change his position concerning a given issue because the more information the individual has the more weighted the plank will become in a given
direction and the more information it will take to change his position or
the more intense the information will have to be.
What are the implications of this fulcrum model with regard to the additive-average conflict in impression formation?

First of all let direction

and extremity of a piece of information operationally be measured by a series
of Osgood's affective semantic differential scales and secondly, let us consider the intensity or weight of the piece of information to be operationally
measured by a 7-point importance scale; then having these values for any one
piece of information taken alone, one should be able to predict on the basis
of the principles derived from the fulcrum model the outcome of any combination of two or more pieces of information.

With regard to the summation-

averaging conflict, it was pointed out that the critical question concerned
that situation where the individual is given two or more pieces ·of information
which have the same direction but different or varying amounts of extremity
and intensity.

That is in a situation where the individual is first given

one piece of information with high affect and then a second piece of information with low affect but the same sign! summation theory predicts an additive effect (i.e., the combination of the two pieces of information will result in a more favorable impression than the one piece of high affect information given alone); however, the averaging theory would predict that the com-

12·
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bination of the two pieces of information would result in an impression of
intermediate value between the high and low affective pieces of information.
With regard to the fulcrum model the situation may be represented as
follows: initially the subject has a neutral impression of the stimulus object
since he has no information hence:

2S

Upon receiving one piece of information having a favorable direction and
having extreme affect, the fulcrum will shift in the direction of that piece
of information hence:

0

/~--=,:ZS:
--~

·Upon receiving a second piece of information havi.ng the same direction
but less extremity with regard to affect, the fulcrum will shift back in the
direction of this second piece of information hence:

0

0

Here it is seen that the fulcrum model makes a similar prediction to the
averaging type models.

The question still remains as to why the individual

should decrease his evaluations of the stimulus object when presented with
a second piece of information having the same direction.
helson's

One could turn to

(1959) adaptation level theory for a possible explanation. If a

subject is given one piece of information about a stimulus object having an
extremely high positive affective evaluation, then the subject may formulate
some kind of a halo effect concerning the stimulus object, i.e., the subject
may generalize from this one piece of information and expect the stimulus
object to have other highly positive affective qualities.

When in fact the

subject is presented with a second piece of positive information which does

lJ.

not quite measure up to his expectations. by contrast to the first piece of
information the subject:.will be disappointed, i.e., his adaptation level will
not have been reached and hence the subject will lower his evaluation of the
stimulus object.

Thus, on the basis of the fulcrum model, the following

hypotheses are put forth:
1.

Given a situation with three pieces of information, all having the

same direction but different with respect to affective extremity and intensity
(importance), that group of subjects given one piece of information with high
affect and importance (berein represented by H) will have a more favorable
impression than (a) that group of subjects given one piece of infonnation
with intermediate affect and importance (herein represented by M); also that
group of subjects given one piece of information with high affect and importance will have a more favorable impression than that group given one piece
of information with low affect and importance (herein represented by 1).
2.

That group of subjects given the two pieces of information H-M

about the stimulus object will have an evaluative rating of the stimulus object which will fall between the evaluative ratings of that group of subjects
given the one piece of information (H) and that group given the one piece
of information (M).

J. That group of subjects given the two pieces of information M-1 about
the stimulus object will have an evaluative rating of the stimulus object

.

which will fall between the evaluative ratings of that group of subjects given
the one piece of information (M) and that group given the one piece of information (1).

Furthermore, that group of subjects presented with the stimulus

combination H-M-1 will have an evaluative rating of the stimulus object which
will fall below the obtained evaluative ratings of that group of subjects
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given just the one piece of information (H).
4.

On the basis of the fulcrum model the following order is predicted

for the mean values of all combinations of information:
(H-M-1).:> (M) 7 (M-1) /(I,).

(H)> (H-1)) (H-M)>

This is in contrast to Fishbein' s summation theory

which would predict (H-M-1) )' (H-M) )' (H-1)> (M-1):::: (H)> (M) "> (L).
Because of the possible effect of differential weighting of pieces of
information due to sequential presentation (Anderson, 1965b; Anderson and
Barrios, 1961), this experiment will also explore the effect of reversal of
the order of presentation of the stimulus information for the separate groups
receiving two or more pieces of information; hence corresponding to that
group which obtained their information in a H-M-1 order there will be a group
which will receive their information in a 1-M-H order; corresponding to that
group of subjects which will obtain their information in a H-L order there
will be a group of subjects which will receive their information in a L-H
order; corresponding to that group of subjects which obtain their information
in a H-M order, there will be a group of subjects which will receive their
information in a M-H order; and finally corresponding to that group of subjects
which receive their information in a M-1 order, there will be a group of
subjects receiving their information in a L-M order.

Although no hypothesis

is being made on the basis of the fulcrum model, a primacy effect will be
obtained if the L-M-H group has a more favorable impression of the stimulus
object.than the H-M-1 group and a recency effect will be obtained if the order
is reversed i.e., if (H-M-1)) (L-M-H) o
Method
;Subjects

~d

Designo

Two hundred ten Introductory Psychology students

11W

attending Loyola University served as subjects in this study - each subject
being randomly assigned to one of fourteen conditions.

The general design

was a 2 x 7 factorial involving two orders of presentation of stimulus material
and seven levels of affective information.
Issues.

In order to select the stimulus material, a pilot group of 35

subjects evaluated a number of political issues on five of Osgood's Semantic
Differential Scales (beneficial-harmful; foolish-wise; dirty~clean; bad-good;
and sick-healthy).

A list of the political issues used are in Appendix I.

The scales used were selected from the A scale of Fishbein and Raven (1962)
and were utilized in order to select one issue of high positive affect, low
positive affect and an issue of intermediate positive affect.

Each scale

then, consisted of a set of polar adjectives separated by the seven points
of the scale.

Thus, each concept rated could obtain a score ranging from

-15 (negative evaluation) to +15 (positive evaluation).

Also, each subject

rated each issue on a seven point importance scale set up in semantic differential form with the polar adjectives being "extremely impo_rtant" at one end
and "extremely unimportant" at the other end.

For example, the subject was

asked, "How important do you consider the above issue, that is, how important
is the above issue to you7"

This is illustrated as follows:

extremely:
important

: extremely unimportant

The importance measure was scored by assigning a weight of 1 to the slot
closest to the phrase "extremely unimportant" and a weight of 7 to the slot
closest to·the phrase "extremely important" and intermediate weights to those
slots between the two ends.

In this way, the weight or intensity of any one

piece of information could be determined for each subject.
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Thus, on the basis

of the products obtained from the two scales (affective scales and importance
scale) any one subject could obtain a score rangjng from (7) (-15) or -105 to

, (?) (+15) or +105.
The issues selected consisted of (a) the one issue which had the highest
positive evaluative x importance rating on the pilot test (attacking organized
crime - mean rating = 57.7); (b) the one issue which had the lowest but positive evaluative x importance rating (European Common Market - mean rating
= 14.7); and (c) an issue which had an intermediate evaluative x importance
rating (highway· expansion program - mean rating= J8.6), i.e., an issue having
an evaluative x importance rating falling between attacking organized crime
and the European Common Market.

An analysis of variance performed on these

ratings indicated that the issues were significantly different from one another

(f = 28.5999;

df = 2, 102; .E <.001) and a Duncan's Multiple Range test in-

dicated that the mean evaluative x importance rating for attacking organized
crime was significantly more favorable

~han

the mean evaluative x importance

rating for the highway expansion program (,E<.005) which in turn was significantly more favorable than the mean evaluative x importance rating for
the European Common Market (,E<.005).

These three issues were selected be-

cause they fitted the necessary criteria of using one issue of high positive
affect x importance score falling midway between the high and the low issues.
Note that the obtained mean evaluative x importance scores have a 20 point
interval between them (low= 14.7; intermediate = J8.6; high = 57.7).

Also,

these three issues bad considerably less variance than any of the other pretested issues.
Experimental Procedure.

Subjects in the actual study were given a test

booklet, the fjrst few pages of which contained a number of filler issues in
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addition to the three issues of attacking organized crime (]igh), highway
expansion program (11edium), and the European Common Market (fow).

The partic-

ular issue to be evaluated on each page was centered at the top and enclosed
in parentheses.

The subjects were instructed as follows: "On this page and

on each of the following pages you will be asked to evaluate a number of
topics.

The issue to be evaluated will be centered in the middle of the page

and enclosed by parentheses.
point scales.
scales.

Following the issue will be a number of seven

Place an "x11 in the appropriate space on these seven-point

For example, if you feel that the issue is very good you might place

your "x" as shown below: 11
bad:

very

neutral

X : good
very

• subjects then proceeded to rate the three issues of concern along
The
with a number of filler issues on the above mentioned Osgood Semantic Differential Scales as well as five of Fishbein's (1962) B (Belief) scales.

The

Fishbein B scales utilized were impossible-possible; false-true; nonexistentexistent; improbable-probable; unlikely-likely.

These five B scales were

interspersed with the above mentioned A scales as well as with some filler
scales.

The B scales were set up in the same fashion as the A scales and

they were scored in the same manner.
could have a B score ranging from

-15

Thus, for any one issue each subject
to

+15.

The B scales were utilize9 in

order to measure each subject's belief in the concept being rated.
After the subject evaluated the issue on the A and B scales as well as
the filler scales, they completed their evaluation of the issue by rating
it on an importance scale which was placed on the same page as the issue but
immediately below the A and B scales.

Here again as in the pilot group, the
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subjects were asked: "How important do you consider the above, that is, how
important is the above issue to you7"

The subjects then checked one of seven

positions of the seven-point scale which was illustrated above.
Thus, on the basis of the pre-test, three scores were obtained for each
subject on each issue: an affect score, a belief score, and an importance
score.

These three measures were determined in order to predict the obtained

evaluation score of the stimulus object, attributed one or more of these
three characteristics, on the basis of Fishbein's summation fbrrnula or the
Fulcrum formula.
After evaluating each of these three dimensions each subject was randomly
given one of eleven communications.

That is, each subject was given one,

two or three pieces of information about a hypothetical Mr. X who was running
for

politic~l

office and then after reading the communication, the subjects

were instructed to rate the hypothetical
like-dislike.

Mr.

X on a seven point scale of

For example, if the subjects felt that they extremely liked

the candidate they were instructed to place their "x" as shown below:
extremely like:

__x___________________ :extremely

dislike

The eleven communications represent the eleven possible combinations of
the three pieces of information prasented singly, in combination and with
order of presentation varied.

Visually this may be represented as follows:
Order of Presentation

Pieces of Information
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H
M
1

H

H-M
H-1
M-1
H-M-L

M-H

M

L

1-H

L-M
L-M-H

For example, one group of subjects was told, "Mr. X is in favor of attacking organized crime" (H group); another group of subjects was told "Mr. X
is in favor of attacking organized crime and he is in favor of the European
Common Market" (H-1 group); and with order of presentation reversed another
group of subjects was told ".Mr. X is in favor of the European Common Market
and he is in favor of attacking organized crime" (1-H group).

This same

format was followed for all treatment groups.
The obtained evaluation of the hypothetical Mr. X on the like-dislike
scale was used to test the predictive power of Fishbein's summation theory
and the Fulcrum theory by correlating this score with the predicted evaluation
of the candidate based on the pre-test evaluation of the political issues
on the A and B scales and the importance scale.
The obtained mean ratings of the hypothetical Mr. X also served as a
lj .

basis to compare the differential predictions stemming from

t~e

summation

i :

theory and the Fulcrum theory; i.e., to determine whether two or more pieces
of information combined in an additive fashion as predicted via Fishbein's
model or whether they combined in a weighted average fashion as predicted
via

th~

Fulcrum model.

After all subjects completed the pre- and post-test evaluations, the
experimenter informed them as to the nature of the researcho
Results
Pretest evaluation of three critical issueso

A separate analysis of

variance was performed on the pretest measures for each of the three pieces
of information that were used to describe the hypothetical Mr. X.

Results

of the ANOVA for the pretest measures on the issue attacking organized crime
(high affect and high importance) are reported in Table 1.

Results indicate
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,.ii

tbat tbe 14 experimental groups were comparable in tbe pretest evaluation of
tbe issue attacking organized crime (.[

= .5339,

Qf

= 13/196).

Results of tbe ANOVA for tbe pretest measures on tbe issue of the higbway
expansion program (intermediate affect and importance) are reported in Table 2.
Results indicate that here also the 14 experimental groups were comparable
witb respect to their pretest evaluation of the issue highway expansion
program (.[

= .955,

df

= lJ/196).
Table 1

ANOVA for Pretest Measures on Issue of
Attacking Organized Crime

Source of Variation

SS

df

MS

Between Groups

109.985

lJ

8.460

Witbin Groups

Jl05.539

196

150845.

F

o5J39

Table 2
ANOVA for Pretest Measures on Issue of
Highway Expansion

Source of Variation

SS

df

MS

Between Groups

3J8.551

lJ

26.042

5341.429

196

27.252

Within Groups

L

P~ogram
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F

.9555

Results of the ANOVA for the pretest measures on the issue of the European
Common Market (low affect and importance) are reported in Table

3. Again the

results indicate that the 14 experimental groups were comparable with respect
to their pretest evaluations of the issue European Common Market
df = 13/196).

(£

= .6264,

Hence all experimental groups gave comparable pretest evaluation

of the issues used to describe the stimulus object.
Table 3
ANOVA for Pretest Measures on Issue of
European Common Market

Source of Variation

SS

df

Between Groups

238.13

lJ

18.3177

5731.44

196

29.2420

Within Groups

MS

F

06264

Also, a separate analysis of variance was performed to determine if the
pretest evaluations of the three pieces of information used to describe the
stimulus object were significantly different from one another as would be
predicted from the results of the pilot group evaluation.
Table 4
ANOVA for Over-all Differences Between Premeasures on
Attacking Organized Crime, highway Expansion Program, and European Market
Source of Variation
Between Groups
Within Groups

SS

df

MS

2660.424

2

1330.212

14865.243

627

23.709

*.E < .001
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F

_56.105*

esults of the ANOVA are reported in Table 4.

Results indicate that there

as a significant difference in the evaluation of the three issues
df

= 2/627, .E.< .001).

(£ = _56.105,

A Duncan's Multiple Range test was performed on the

means of these evaluations and results indicate that attacking organized crime
as rated significantly more favorably than the highway expansion program
(.E,(.001) which in turn was rated significantly more favorably than the European Common Market (.E,<.001).

See Table 5 for these results.
Table 5

Duncan Multiple Range Test for Differences Between Mean Ratings on
Pretest Measures of Attacking Organized Crime,
Highway Expansion Program, and European Common Market

Moans

ECM

HEP

AOC

5.77

7.39

l0.7

ECM
HEP

1.62*

4.9J*
3.31*

*.E < .001
Obtained Evaluations

of~

stimulus objecto

With respect to the Ful-

crum model, it was predicted that the subject's evaluation of the stimulus
object, Mr. X, would be a function not of the total amount of affect and
importance of the affect that was associated with each of the pieces of information attributed to the stimulus object as predicted by Fishbein's sumation model, but instead would be a weighted average function of the amount
of affect and importance associated with each of the pieces of information
attributed to the stimulus object.

Table 6 presents the results of the ANOVA

performed on the post-test measures of the evaluation of the stimulus object
23

L

fter having been attributed 1, 2, or 3 characteristics.
that there was no main effect for the order of

•

information (.[

= .014,

df

= 1/196);

Results indicate

pr~sentation

of the stimulus

there was no interaction between order

of presentation of stimulus material and amount of information (.[ = .398,
df = 6/196); however, there was a highly significant main effect due to the
mount of information presented about the stimulus object

(f

= 8.7444, g_f =

/196, .E <.001).
Table 6
ANOVA for Post-Test Rating of Stimulus Object

Source of Variation

Ax B
Within Cell

~aterial,

.019

F

1

.019

.014

69.828

6

ll.6)8

J.181

6

.530

260.867

196

l.JJl

Since there was no significant
of stimulus

df

MS

Order (A)
Information (B)

SS

m~in

8.744*
.)98

effect due to order of presentation

order was collapsed, and a Duncan's Multiple Range Test

as performed on the means of the remaining seven groups.

Results of this

est are presented in Table 7.
Inspection of this table reveals that the obtained mean ratings of the
stimulus object for that group of subjects given only the one piece of information

1:!

rated the stimulus object significantly more favorably than those sub24 .
. -~

__j

jects given the one piece of information~ (,E.(.001); also, these same subjects rated the stimulus object significantly more favorably than those subjects given the one piece of information
given the one piece of information

~

.1 (,E<.001). Although those subjects

did not rate the stimulus object sig-

nificantly more favorably than those subjects given the one piece of information _1, results approach significance at the .E = .1 level.

Thus, for

both Fishbein's summation theory and Izzett's Fulcrum theory, empirical support has been obtained.
Table 7
Duncan Multiple Range Test for Differences Between Mean Ratings on
Post-Test Evaluation of Stimulus Object
L

M-L

M

H-M-1

H-M

H-L

H

4.5

4.7

4.9

5.47

5.57

5.67

6.27

L

NS

NS

NS

.01

.001

.001

0001

M-L

NS

NS

NS

.05

.01

.01

.001

M

NS

NS

NS

olO

.05

.05

.001

H-M-L

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

005

H-M

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

005

H-L

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

NS

.05

Means

The critical comparison between the two models lies in the obtained
ratings of that group of subjects given the two pieces of information H-M
with respect to those subjects given the one piece of information H and those
given the one piece of information

J:!;

also, another critical comparison lies

in the obtained ratings of that group of subjects given the two piece of
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information M-L and those subjects given the one piece of infonnation M alone
and the one piece of information L alone.
Inspection of Table 7 reveals that those subjects given the two pieces
of information H-M rate the stimulus object significantly more favorably than
those subjects given the one piece of infonnation ~ (,E<.05) but significantly
less than those subjects given the one piece of infonnation

~alone

(£ <.05).

This is in direct contrast to Fishbein's summation model but is as predicted
by the Fulcrum model.

Although those subjects given the two pieces of in-

formation M-L do not differ significantly from those just given the infonnation

-Lalone

or Malone, the results are in the direction predicted by the Fulcrum

-

model and are directly opposite to those predicted by Fishbein's summation
model.
Further support is given to the Fulcrum model if one looks at that group
of subjects which was given the two pieces of information H-L and that group
of subjects given the three pieces of information H-M-1.

Again, those sub-

jects given the two pieces of information H-1 evaluate the stimulus object
significantly less favorably than those given the one piece of information

E (£<.05).

Again both of these findings lend support to the Fulcrum model

and contradict Fishbein's summation model.
Correlational Data.

Two predicted attitude scores were determined for

each subject - one based on Izzett•s Fulcrum model and the other based on
Fishbein's summation model.
According to the Fulcrum model, an individual's attitude toward any
stimulus object should be a weighted average function of the sum of the
products of the evaluative aspect of any single piece of information (Ai)

L

and the importance (I) of that piece of information to the subject divided
by the sum of the importance ratings of each of the pieces of information.
Thus, by the direct application of the formula a predicted attitude score
was determined for each subject i.e.,

Predicted Attitude

=

where Ai = the evaluation of the polarity of any piece of
information about the stimulus object.
I = the importance of any piece of information about
the stimulus object
N = the number of pieces of information.
Fishbein on the other hand, predicts that an individual's attitude
toward any given object is a function of the sum of the products of the beliefs about the stimulus object (Bi.) and the evaluative aspects of these
beliefs (a1).

According to the Fishbein model then, the predicted attitude
N

score for any one subject equals 2:Bj_ai.
-""'I

The intercorrelations between the two predicted scores and the obtained
scores across all treatments are reported in Table 8.

As indicated in the

Table 8
Intercorrelations of the Predicted Scores and the
Actual Posttest Evaluation of the Attitude Object
Fishbein
Prediction
(1)

Fulcrum
Prediction
(2)

1

·79*

Obtained

(3)
.4J*

2
'

II
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table both predictors are significantly correlated with the obtained scores
(£(.005).

However, the predictions based on the Fulcrum model are signifi-

cantly more accurate than the predictions based on Fishbein's summation
model (z = 2.43, £<•01).

This finding lends further support to the Fulcrum

model and again suggests that impression formation is a weighted average
cognitive function rather than a function of cognitive summation.

Furthermore

a partial correlation between the predicted and the obtained evaluation based
on the Fulcrum prediction with the correlation between the Fishbein prediction
and the obtained score partialed out results in a correlation of +.4884,
while a partial correlation between the predicted and the obtained evaluation
based on Fishbein's prediction with the correlation between the Fulcrum
prediction and the obtained score partialed out results in a correlation of
-0.1068 - a difference significant at £<.OOl (z

= 6.53).

Two further correlations were obtained for those subjects who received
only one piece of information about the stimulus object in order to determine
the predictive power of Fishbein's belief component (Bi) and Izzett's importance component (I).

The obtained correlation based on Fishbein's Bi component

is .46 (£(.005) and the obtained correlation based on Izzett's (I) component
is .58 (,;e(.005).

However, the two correlations do not differ significantly

from one another (z = 1.09, N.S.).
]! alone,

~alone

receiv~ng

and

1

Furthermore, eliminating the three groups

alone and working only with those groups of subjects

two or more pieces of information produces a correlation of .63

for the Fulcrum model and a correlation of .41 for Fishbein's model.

The

difference between these two correlations is significant at the ,;e(.05 level,
again pointing to the greater predictive power of the Fulcrum model.
28

Further, a rank order correlation, rho, was obtained for both Fishbein's
surrunation prediction and the Fulcrum weighted average prediction.

According

to Fishbein's summation model the following order for the means of the ob-

•

tained scores was predicted: (H-M-L) / (H-M) > (H-1)/ (M-1)

=

The obtained rank order correlation for Fishbein's model was
this was not significantly different from zero (z

(H)> (M) )' (1).

.53.

However,

= 1.29).

According to the Fulcrum model, the predicted rank order for the means
of the obtained scores was (H) )' (H-L)

> (H-M) > (H-M-1) > (M)) (M-1) > (L).

Here

the obtained rank order correlation was 1.00 which was significantly different from zero (z = 2.45,

_E.£.

.01).

Again, the evidence points to the greater

predictive power of the Fulcrum model.
Discussion
This experiment set up a curcial test of the predictive powers of an
additive model of impression formation (Fishbein) versus a weighted average
model of impression formation (Fulcrum model) by presenting the subjects with
one, two or three pieces of information which varied in terms of degree of
affect and importance to the subject but with sign of affect held constant in
all situations (positive).

The results indicated that there was a significant
I

main affect due to the amount of information presented to the subject; moreover, the results confirmed the prediction of the Fulcrum or weighted average
model at the .001 level of significance and hence did not support the predictions generated from Fishbein's summation model.
The results indicated that there was no significant main effect due to
the order of presentation of the stimulus material.
in one of two ways.

One can interpret this

First of all, previous studies have indicated a primaey
29

effect for sequential presentation of stimulus information; however, although
this study varied the order of presentation of the stimulus information, the
information was presented in the format

of either Mr. X is in favor of H-M

or Mr. X is in favor of M-H, which would be considered as simultaneous presentation of the stimulus material.

Or alternatively, one could say that

for those subjects who received their information in the H-M-L, H-M, H-L
M-L order, their adaptation level concerning the stimulus object was continually lower since their expectancies of the stimulus objects were not met on
the basis of each prior piece of information and that those subjects receiving
their information in the L-M-H, M-H, L-H, L-M order had their adaptation level
raised with each successive piece of information.

Perhaps by varying the time

interval over a period of a few days between successive pieces of information
a primacy effect may be obtained.
The results also indicate that the fulcrum model bas greater power than
a summation model in predicting the obtained evaluation of a stimulus object
on the basis of prior knowledge with respect to the affective evaluation of
separate piece of information about the stimulus object and the importance
of these pieces of information to the subject; e.g., knowing the subject's
affective evaluation of the issues "attacking organized crime" and the "highway expansion program" as well as the importance of these issues to the subject, one can predict the subject's evaluation of another person who is in
favor of these two issues to a significantly greater extent on the basis of
a weighted average model of impression formation than on the basis of an
additive model.
In effect what is occuring, is that if a subject is given two (or more)
pieces of. information about a stimulus object and each piece of informatior.

1

•

-

JO

is respectively of high affect and importance (H) and intermediate affect
and importance (M) to the subject, then he will rate the stimulus object to
a less favorable extent than if the subject were given only one piece of

•
information about the stimulus object that was of high affect and importance.
In other words, the more positive information you give a subject about a
stimulus object, the more likely you will lower the subject's evaluation of
that object if all of the information does not have the same affective importance to the subject.
This phenomena could be explained in terms of the expectations of the
subject.

If a subject is given just one piece of infonnation about a stimulus

object, and that piece of information has high positive affective importance
to the subject, then the subject's adaptation level concerning the stimulus
object would shift in the direction of that piece of information (Helson, 1959)
Those subjects would then have the high expectations that any other piece of
information about the stimulus object would also have a high affective and
importance value.

For example, if a layman were told that Dr. X was an ex-

cellent research scientist at University Y, then they might also expect him
to be ah excellent teacher in the classroom.

This being the case, then those

subjects who are told that Dr. X is only a slightly better than average
teacher (a piece of information which would normally be somewhat positively
evaluated) by contrast to their first piece of information that Dr. X was
an excellent researcher would not have their expectations met and hence there
would be a displacement of the subject's evaluation of the stimulus object in
a downward direction

~

hence the averaging effect.

Likewise, those subjects given as their first piece of information that
Dr. X is a slightly better than average teacher would evaluate the man to

.

.

n

only a slightly positive extent and hence their expectations of the man
would not be as great as those subjects who are told that Dr. X is an excellent researcher, i.e., their adaptation level is lower; however, when
these subjects are told that in addition to being only a slightly better
than average teacher, Dr. X is also an excellent researcher, this piece of
information more than meets their expectations concerning the man and hence
the additional piece of information "Dr. X is an excellent researcher" bas
the effect of increasing the subjects evaluation of the man.
It is to be noted that Osgood's congruity theory would have made the
same prediction in the above situation but in terms of the subjects striving
to.maintain cognitive balance or congruity.

However, let us take another

situation to point out the difference between Osgood's congruity model and

.

the fulcrum model especially with respect to the expectations of the subject.
Suppose that a departmental committee on faculty appointments was looking
for a man to join their department.

let us further-suppose the department

consisted of a staff in which everyone was an excellent teacher but that
no one was doing any research and hence their concern was for a man who
was an excellent researcher and that they were not at all concerned about
the type of teacher this man was, i.e., being an excellent researcher was
of prime importance (+7) on a 0 to +7 scale, and teaching qualities not
being of any concern to the appointment committee receives a weight of
zero (0).
The problem with Osgood's (1963) extension of his congruity theory is
the assumed isomorphism between the subject's affective response to a piece
of information and the weight given to that piece of information in fonning
an impression, i.e., in looking at

Osgo~d's
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extension of his congruity theory:

Predicted Attitude

•
where lail and (a.j} =

the absolute and algebraic evaluation
of the "ith" piece of information

=

the absolute and algebraic evaluation
of the noun modified by i-1 pieces of
information.

Thus, if a subject affectively evaluates a piece of information as +J,
the weight given to that piece of information is also +J and if a subject
affectively evaluates a piece of information as +l, the weight given to
that piece of information is also +l; this theoretical thinking is in accord
with the work of Podell and Podell (1963) which suggests that extreme pieces
of information are given greater weight than pieces of information of intermediate value.

The fulcrum model on the other hand assigns a separate weight

to a piece of information on the basis of the importance of that information
to the subject.
Going

bac~

then to our committee on faculty appointments, they have a

need for an excellent researcher and obtaining such a man can reduce or
satisfy (at least partially) this need, hence great importance is placed
on the trait "excellent researcher"; and because there is no need for the
man to be an excellent teacher, this trait is given no weight or importance
at all - hence it bas a value of zero.
Suppose now that the committee on faculty appointments obtained a letter
of recommendation concerning an applicant in which it was indicated that

.

the candidate was an excellent researcher but only a slightly better than
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average researcher.

Further, assume that excelent researchers are affectively

evaluated as +3 on a -3 to +3 scale and that slightly better than average
teachers are evaluated as +l on the same scale.

Then Osgood's prediction

•
concerning the candidate would

be~

Predicted attitude = !JI (+3)

=

+

Ill

(+J)

-+---.1:-'p=--.;J'"'"""'

~""'1-"lJ::.;-J

-9 +4

1

= 2.5

However, the fulcrum prediction would be:
Predicted Attitude

= 2..
Ji A.I.
l. l.

.i.~1_

%_

v-1

I

.
1

= (+J};j-7)

+ (1) (o) = 3
7 + 0

Hence, being only a slightly better than average teacher would be superfluous information to the committee on appointments according to the Fulcrum
model, but according to Osgood's model it would hurt the candidate.

However,

according to S. Rosenberg (1968), a person may (depending on the occasion)
ignore or assign weights of zero to some information.

Hence, according to

the Fulcrum model, the weight assigned to a piece of information depends on
the make-up of the individual and his needs and what be considers to be important and.does not necessarily carry the weight whose values is equal to
the affective evaluation of the piece of information.

This, however, is a

point to be explored in future research.
The Fulcrum model also bas some interesting implications with respect
to source effects, and traits of the subject receiving the information such
as intelligence and qogrnatism.

With regard to source effects one would expect

more of an averaging effect and hence a less positive evaluation of a stimulus

.
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object with a high source than with a low source even if all information
presented is positive.

For example, if a high source said that a man was.

an excellent researcher, the general tendency of the recipient of the information might be that the man was also an excellent teacher, hence his expectations concerning the man as a teacher would be quite high.

As a result

of such high expectations any information which did.not meet these expectations (e.g., the man is only an average teacher) would by contrast lessen
the evaluation of the man; one might expect that the contrast between the
expectation of the man and the actual information obtained would be greater
if it stemmed from a high source than a low source and hence the high source
would result in a less favorable impression of the man.
With regard to intelligence, one might expect that the more intelligent
subject might have a greater capacity to have differential expectations concerning the traits of an object and hence if they are told that a candidate
for an academic position is an excellent researcher, their expectations concerning the teaching qualities of the man might be more realistic than his
lesser intelligent counterpart who following the "great man theory" might
have high expectations concerning the candidate in all areas, hence the contrast then between the expectations of the high intelligent subject concerriing
the candidate and the actual obtained infonnation on other traits may not be
as great and hence there would be less of an averaging effect.

One might

also expect the reverse finding for dogmatic subjects, i.e., the higher the
D score of the subject the

~

the averaging effect obtained.

Although just

speculation, these hypotheses would provide interesting topics for further
research.

35

References
Anderson, L.

and Fishbein, H.

Prediction of attitude from the number,

strength and evaluative aspects of beliefs about the attitude object:
A comparison of summation and Congruity theories.

Journal of Personality

and Social Psychology, 1965, 3, 437-443.
Anderson, N.

Application of an additive model to impression formation,

Science, 1962, 138, 817-818.
Anderson, N.

Averaging versus adding as a stimulus-combination rule in

impression formation, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1965a, 70,

394-400.
Anderson, N.

Primacy effects in personality impression formation using a

generalized order effect paradigm, Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 1965b, 2, 1-9.
Anderson, N. and Barrios, A.

Primacy effects in personality impression form-

ation, Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1961, 63, 346-350.
Edwards, A. L.

Experimental Design in Psychological Research, New York:

Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960.
Feather, N.

A structural balance model of communication effects, Psycholog-

ical Revi~~· 1964, 71, 291-313.
Feldman,

s.·

Evaluative ratings of adjective-adjective combinations, pre-

dicted from ratings of their components.

Unpublished doctoral dissert -

ation, Yale University, 1962.
Festinger, L.

~

theory of cognitive dissonance.

sity Press, 1957·

J6

Stanford: Stanford Univer-

ology, 1955, 50, 321-326.
Newcomb, T.

An approach to the study of communicative acts, Psychological

Review, 1953. 60, 393-404 •

•
Osgood, C., and Tannenbaum, P.

The principle of congruity in the prediction

of attitude change, Psychological Review, 1955, 62, 42-55·
Podell, H., and Podell, J.

Quantitative connotation of a concept, Journal

of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1963, 67, 509-513.
Rhine, R.

A concept-formation approach to attitude acquisition, Psychological

Review, 1958, 65, 362-370.
Rosenberg, M., and Abelson, R.

An analysis of cognitive balancing, In C.

Hovland and M. Rosenberg (Eds.) Attitude organization~ change. New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1960, 112-163.
Rosenberg, S.

Mathematical models of social behavior, in G. Lindzey and

E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology, Vol. I,
Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1968.
Staats, A., and Staats, C.

Attitudes established by classical conditioning,

Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1958, 57, 37-40.
Tanka, T.

A test of congruity hypothesis across three language/culture

communities (doctoral dissertation, University of Illinois) Ann Arbor,
Mich.: University Microfilms, 1964, No. 64-5589.
Triandis, H., and Fishbein, M.

Cognitive interaction in person perception,

Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 196j, 67, 446-453.
Winer, B. J.

Statistical Principles in Experimental Design, New York:

McGraw-Hill, 1962.

38

Appendix I
List of Issues Evaluated by
Pre-Experimental Subjects

attacking organized crime
highway expansion program
European Common Market
federal aid to education
farm program
prison reform
nuclear test ban treaty
gun control
eliminating the draft
open housing
lowering the voting age to 18
foreign aid program
decreasing

foreig~

travel

increasing tariffs
political patronage system
eliminating capital punishment
legalizing marihuana
social welfare program
farm program
Southeast Atlantic Treaty Organization
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